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REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

STRENGTHENING OF THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INCLUDING SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Letter dated 7 May 1996 from the Permanent Representatives of France and the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

As representatives of the States that jointly chaired the Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security, held in Moscow on 19 and 20 April 1996, we have the honour to transmit to you herewith the texts of the Moscow Summit Declaration on Nuclear Safety and Security (see annex I), the Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material (see annex II), a statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (see annex III), a statement on Ukraine (see annex IV) and a statement by participants in the Moscow Summit concerning Lebanon and the peace process (see annex V).

* A/51/50.

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We should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the General Assembly under items 14, 21, 33, 66, 71 and 98 of the preliminary list.

(Signed) Alain DEJAMMET
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of France to the United Nations

(Signed) Sergey LAVROV
Ambassador
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ANNEX I

[Original: English, French and Russian]

Moscow Summit Declaration on Nuclear Safety and Security

1. The end of the cold war and the political economic reforms in Russia have opened a new era in our relationship and have provided the international community with real possibilities for cooperation in the fields of nuclear safety and security. The Moscow meeting is an important step in the achievement of these objectives. We are determined, at this summit and beyond, to work together to ensure the safety of nuclear power and to promote greater security for nuclear materials.

2. We are committed to giving absolute priority to safety in the use of nuclear energy. As we approach the tenth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident, it is our shared objective that such a catastrophe cannot recur.

We are ready to cooperate among ourselves so that the use of nuclear energy is conducted all over the world in accordance with fundamental principles of nuclear safety. Further, we are committed to measures that will enable nuclear power, already a significant contributor to electricity supply in those countries choosing to use it, to continue in the next century to play an important role in meeting future world energy demand in accordance with the goal of sustainable development agreed at the Rio Conference in 1992.

We recognize the importance of openness and transparency to obtain public trust, which is a key factor for the use of nuclear energy.

3. The security of all nuclear material is an essential part of the responsible and peaceful use of nuclear energy. In particular, the safe management of fissile material, including material resulting from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, is imperative, not least as a safeguard against any risk of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.

4. In the spirit of the decisions adopted during the New York conference of May 1995 on review and extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, we will increase our cooperation in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament by promoting universal adherence to the NPT, working vigorously to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system and through effective and responsible export control measures. We are issuing a separate text on a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). We renew our commitment to the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Nuclear safety

5. Recognizing that the prime responsibility for nuclear safety rests with national Governments, it is of primary importance to continue to enhance international collaborative efforts to promote a high level of nuclear safety world wide.

Safety of civilian nuclear reactors

6. Nuclear safety has to prevail over all other considerations. We reaffirm our commitment to the highest internationally recognized safety level for the siting, design, construction, operation and regulation of nuclear power installations.

7. The promotion of an effective nuclear safety culture in each country with nuclear installations is essential to that end.

8. Sustainable nuclear safety also requires a supportive economic and legal environment in which both operators and national regulatory bodies can fully assume their independent responsibilities.

9. Nuclear safety can also be enhanced by greater international transparency in nuclear power activities, in particular by means of peer reviews, and this should lead to existing reactors that do not meet current safety requirements being brought to an acceptable level of safety or ceasing operation.

10. The adoption of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which reaffirms these fundamental safety principles, is a major accomplishment in this field. We urge all countries to sign this Convention and to complete internal procedures to join so that the Convention can be brought into force expeditiously certainly before the end of 1996.

11. National efforts have been made in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the newly independent States to improve nuclear safety levels, often in cooperation with multilateral and bilateral programmes. In this regard, we acknowledge these important efforts to upgrade reactor safety and improve safety culture, but note that further substantial progress is still required. We reaffirm our commitment to cooperate fully to achieve this.

Nuclear liability

12. An effective nuclear liability regime must assure adequate compensation to victims of and for damage caused by nuclear accidents. In addition, to secure the degree of private sector involvement needed to undertake vital safety improvements, the regime should at the same time protect industrial suppliers from unwarranted legal action.

13. The essential principles in this area are the exclusive and strict liability of the operator of the nuclear installations and ensuring needed financial security for adequate compensation.

14. It is essential that countries with nuclear installations that have not yet done so establish an effective regime for liability for nuclear damage corresponding to these principles.

15. It is important to work together to enhance the international regime of liability for nuclear damage with a view to ensuring that it will attract wide adherence and accommodate any State which may wish to become a party. We encourage the experts to make further progress to this end. In this connection, the reinforcement of regional cooperation is welcomed.

Energy sector strategies in countries in transition

16. Efficient market-oriented strategies for energy sector reform are essential to promote nuclear safety. This will generate adequate resources for investment in safety upgrades and maintenance, and encourage energy conservation. All countries in transition should pursue such market-oriented reforms and investment strategies based upon least-cost planning, giving due regard to nuclear safety and environmental criteria, and to energy efficiency and conservation.

17. The international financial institutions have played a leading role in developing market-oriented energy sector reforms and investment plans. Their continued involvement and support is critical to ensure further progress.

Nuclear waste management

International convention

18. National authorities must ensure that radioactive waste is managed safely and that provisions are made for its proper handling, storage and ultimate disposal. These are essential elements for any nuclear energy programme.

19. The development of the convention on the safety of radioactive waste management, based on these principles, is of paramount importance. We call on all countries generating nuclear waste with nuclear installations to participate actively in the preparation of this convention under the auspices of the IAEA and to encourage its effective finalization and prompt adoption.

Ocean dumping

20. We commit ourselves to ban dumping at sea of radioactive waste and encourage all States to adhere at an earliest possible date to the 1993 amendment of the London Convention.

Nuclear material security

Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material

21. Illicit trafficking of nuclear material is a public safety and non-proliferation concern. We recognized the importance of this issue at our meetings in Naples and Halifax. As risks continue to exist, we have agreed on,

and released, a programme for preventing and combating illicit trafficking in nuclear material to ensure increased cooperation among our Governments in all aspects of prevention, detection, exchange of information, investigation and prosecution in cases of illicit nuclear trafficking.

We call on other Governments to join us in implementing this programme.

Nuclear material accounting and control and physical protection

22. We reaffirm the fundamental responsibility of nations to ensure the security of all nuclear materials in their possession and the need to ensure that they are subject to effective systems of nuclear material accounting and control and physical protection. These systems should include regulations, licensing and inspections. We express our support for the IAEA safeguards regime, which plays a critical role in providing assurance against the diversion of nuclear material going undetected. We underline the need for the urgent strengthening of IAEA capabilities to detect undeclared nuclear activities. We note that these measures are also conducive to preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear material.

23. We recognize the importance of continually improving systems and technologies for controlling and protecting nuclear materials. We urge nations to cooperate bilaterally, multilaterally and through the IAEA to ensure that the national systems for controlling nuclear materials remain effective. We are encouraged by the wide array of cooperative projects under way in this field under bilateral and multilateral auspices and pledge to sustain and increase these efforts.

24. We urge ratification by all States of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and encourage the application of the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material.

25. We pledge our support for efforts to ensure that all sensitive nuclear material (separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium) designated as not intended for use for meeting defence requirements is safely stored, protected and placed under IAEA safeguards (in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer IAEA safeguards agreements) as soon as it is practicable to do so.

Safe and effective management of weapons fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes

26. Major steps have been taken in recent years towards nuclear disarmament. This has created substantial stocks of fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes. It is vital, as mentioned above, that these stockpiles are safely managed and eventually transformed into spent fuel or other forms equally unusable for nuclear weapons and disposed of safely and permanently.

27. The primary responsibility for the safe management of weapons fissile material rests with the nuclear-weapon States themselves, but other States and international organizations are welcome to assist where desired.

28. We welcome the steps that the United States and the Russian Federation have taken to blend highly enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled nuclear weapons to low-enriched uranium (LEU) for peaceful non-explosive purposes, and the cooperation programmes of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and other States with the Russian Federation for the safe storage, the peaceful uses of fissile material released by the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and their safe and secure transportation for that purpose; we encourage other efforts along these lines.

29. We are determined to identify appropriate strategies for the management of fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes. Options include safe and secure long-term storage, vitrification or other methods of permanent disposal, and conversion into mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) for use in nuclear reactors. We have agreed to share relevant experience and expertise to elaborate and implement these strategies. We welcome plans to conduct small-scale technology demonstrations related to these options, including the possibility of establishing pilot projects and plants. We shall convene an international meeting of experts in order to examine available options and identify possible development of international cooperation in the implementation of these national strategies, bearing in mind technical, economic, non-proliferation, environmental and other relevant considerations. The meeting will take place in France by the end of 1996.

30. We recognize the importance of ensuring transparency in the management of highly enriched uranium and plutonium designated as no longer required for defence purposes.

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Background documents on "Nuclear safety", "Nuclear material accounting, control and physical protection" and "Safe and effective management of weapons fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes" are being released separately.

ANNEX II

[Original: English, French and Russian]

Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material

Illicit trafficking in nuclear material (as defined by article XX of the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency) continues to pose a global proliferation risk and a potential danger to public health and safety. We have recognized the importance of this issue at our meetings in Naples and Halifax. The criminal diversion of nuclear material could assist States or terrorist groups to bypass the carefully crafted controls of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and permit them to construct or otherwise acquire a nuclear or radiological weapon. The majority of cases, so far, have involved only small amounts of fissile material or material of little use for weapons purposes, and many apprehended nuclear traffickers have been swindlers or petty thieves. Nevertheless, cases of illicit nuclear trafficking continue to occur. Accordingly, we have concluded that increased cooperation among our Governments to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear material will contribute to increased international security and public safety, and to achievement of global non-proliferation objectives.

International efforts to suppress illicit trafficking in nuclear material should address several fundamental aspects of the problem:

- Safe and secure storage of nuclear material and effective material protection, control and accounting to prevent its diversion;

- Cooperative intelligence, customs and law enforcement efforts to prevent the transportation and sale of diverted material;

- Joint efforts to identify and suppress illicit supply of, and demand for, nuclear material and to deter potential traffickers.

In addition, nuclear material released by the dismantling of nuclear weapons and no longer required for defence purposes must be safely, affordably and effectively stored, protected and controlled, until it can be used for non-explosive purposes or safely and permanently disposed of. This material must also be placed under international safeguards as soon as it is practicable to do so.

The international community's response to these challenges should draw upon and further reinforce the existing instruments and organizations of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. These include universal adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Principles and Objectives agreed at the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference, and to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, as well as application of the recommendations on physical protection made by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Cooperation within

the framework of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group is important in the fight against illicit trafficking.

The storage and control of nuclear material is, first and foremost, a national responsibility but the international community should support national efforts by providing coordinated assistance, where needed, to ensure that all nuclear material is safely and securely stored and accurately and effectively controlled and accounted for. Cooperative assistance involving IAEA, the European Union or other arrangements should be maintained and adequately funded.

In order to strengthen our collective response to illicit trafficking in nuclear material we will:

- Regular share and promptly disseminate, in accordance with the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, information on nuclear theft and smuggling incidents;

- Exchange information on significant incidents in this area, especially if sensitive material is involved, and establish appropriate national points of contact for this purpose;

- Foster enhanced cooperation and coordination among our national intelligence, customs and law enforcement agencies and cooperation with those other concerned countries in order to ensure prompt investigation and successful prosecution in cases of illicit nuclear trafficking;

- Vigilantly discharge our national responsibility to ensure the effective storage, protection, control and accounting of nuclear material in our respective territories;

- Exchange experience and advice among ourselves and make it available to others and support efforts to provide appropriate assistance to ensure safe and effective nuclear material storage, protection, control and accounting;

- Maintain effective national systems of export licensing and control, which are important to deter and prevent illicit trafficking, and encourage and assist other States to do the same;

- Support efforts to define training requirements pertaining to detection of concealed nuclear material, radiation protection, safe handling and transportation of nuclear material and radiation protection, for law enforcement agencies (customs, police) in accordance with their respective tasks and closely coordinate relevant training activities in this area;

- Support the exchange of scientific information and data to permit the identification of the origin, history and route of seized illicit nuclear material;

- Support efforts to ensure that all sensitive nuclear material (separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium) not intended for use in meeting defence requirements is safely and effectively stored and protected and placed under IAEA safeguards (in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant "voluntary offer" IAEA safeguards agreements) as soon as it is practicable to do so;

- Work to strengthen the effective application of IAEA safeguards and encourage all States to provide adequate funding for them;

- Seek to identify strategies for the safe, effective and affordable peaceful use of nuclear material no longer required for defence purposes or for its safe permanent disposal;

- Encourage bilateral and other assistance and cooperation arrangements in the above areas and support their appropriate coordination to ensure that they are complementary and mutually reinforcing and to avoid needless duplication of efforts;

- Promote universal adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which remains the fundamental basis for all international efforts to prevent the illicit spread of nuclear material, technology and expertise;

- Contribute to the enhanced treaty review process and implement the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament agreed at the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference;

- Work to promote the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ANNEX III

[Original: English, French and Russian]

Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

We affirmed our commitment to conclude and sign a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by September 1996. We agreed that a CTBT will be a concrete step towards the achievement of one of the highest priority objectives of the international community in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, and the fulfilment of the obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We also agreed that the CTBT must prohibit any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. We affirmed that this would constitute a truly comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

In this connection, we recalled the importance of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted on 11 May 1995.

ANNEX IV

[Original: English, French and Russian]

Statement on Ukraine

We met on 20 April 1996 with President Kuchma of Ukraine and together examined a wide range of issues to improve nuclear safety and security. We agreed to continue our bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Ukraine in this field.

President Kuchma announced Ukraine's endorsement of the Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material and expressed his willingness to support the objectives and actions described in the Moscow Summit Declaration on Nuclear Safety and Security. President Kuchma also endorsed the statement on the CTBT.

The importance of President Kuchma's decision to close Chernobyl by the year 2000 in accordance with the memorandum of understanding signed on 20 December 1995 with all its provisions was recognized.

The signatories to the memorandum reaffirmed their commitment to its full implementation and will cooperate closely with Ukraine and with international development banks on measures to support Ukraine's decision. For his part, President Kuchma confirmed Ukraine's willingness to cooperate actively and efficiently within the framework of the memorandum.

We also discussed the study that is under way, funded by the European Union, on a renewed sarcophagus for reactor 4 at Chernobyl. This study should be completed as soon as possible this year. We agreed that decisions would need to be taken in the light of the conclusions of the study with the objective of finding a solution to the problem.

ANNEX V

[Original: English, French and Russian]

Statement by participants in the Moscow Summit

We are seriously concerned over the course of events in the Middle East. We urge an immediate cease-fire. Only a political solution can ensure a long-term settlement of the current crisis and allow for a renewed peace process. We fully support efforts that are being made in this direction.

The peoples of Lebanon and Israel must have a chance to live in peace and security. Nobody must be allowed to put up obstacles on this road or impede progress to peace in the entire region.